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Abstract
While ¯rms claim to be concerned with consumer reactions to price increases, these often
do not cause large reductions in purchases. The model developed here ¯ts this by letting
consumers react negatively only when they become convinced that prices are unfair. This
can explain price rigidity, though its implications are not identical to those of existing
models of costly price adjustment. In particular, the frequency of price adjustment can
depend on economy-wide variables observed by consumers. This has implications for the
e®ects of monetary policy and can explain why in°ation does not fall immediately after a
monetary tightening.
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Price setters have been asked on repeated occasions to explain why their prices stay constant
in nominal terms for periods of time that are vastly longer than the period over which the
opportunity cost of production stays constant. The two most common answers received by
Hall and Hitch (1939) involved the psychology of customers. They were, in particular, that
\conventional price [is] in [the] minds of buyers" and that \Price changes [are] disliked by
buyers." Blinder et al (1998) asked price setters about the validity of various theories of
sticky prices developed by economists, so they did not ask directly whether price changes
were disliked by customers. Nonetheless, a majority of their respondents volunteered that
changing prices would \antagonize" or \cause di±culties" with their customers (p. 308).
The simplest model of such negative reactions would posit that the quantity demanded
falls dramatically every time a price is increased, perhaps because price increases trigger
search as suggested by Stiglitz (1984). However, many price increases are associated with only
trivial instantaneous reductions in the quantity demanded. A second, and more standard
explanation for the existence of periods where prices are ¯xed, involves the assumption that
there are non-convex costs of changing prices. These costs are usually motivated by the
observation that posting prices involves physical resources so that resources must be spent
to change prices by, for example, printing new catalogues (Sheshinski and Weiss 1977).
While Levy et. al. (1997) show that the resource costs of changing prices in supermarkets
are nontrivial, these administrative costs simply cannot be the whole story.
To see this, Figure 1 shows the prices charged by a supermarket chain for a particular
product. A striking feature of this series is the recurrence of downwards spikes, short periods
where this particular item is \on special". In addition to new price labels, this often involves
changes in the item's physical display. The price changes again when the promotion is over
though the supermarket often chooses exactly the same price as prevailed before the special.
Thus, ¯rms appear to have a preference for prices they have charged before even when the
resource costs needed to post such prices are the same as those that would be needed to
1display any other price.
Another common approach to modelling price rigidity is to suppose that price setters
have imperfect information (see Lucas 1972). However, the prices of many raw materials are
well publicized and move minute by minute while, at the same time, ¯nished goods prices
accounting for a large fraction of sales are set by a small number of individuals. It seems
hard to believe that these individuals, who are presumably selected for their ability, fail to
update their beliefs regarding optimal prices for months at a time. On the other hand, it
seems quite plausible for customers to have poor information about the costs of producers,
and this plays a key role in the model.
One attraction of focusing on how consumers perceive prices is that ¯rms routinely say
they want their prices to be \fair." As discussed by Hall and Hitch (1939), many ¯rms set
prices using the \cost-plus" method which involves starting with variable unit cost, adding
the average overhead cost per unit under that assumption that ¯rms produce at \capacity"
and, lastly, adding a margin of pro¯t. Oxenfeldt (1951, p. 158) reports: \Questionnaire and
¯eld surveys indicate the particular acceptance of a margin as `fair' to be the most important
reason for the widespread use of that margin."
As emphasized in the questionnaire study of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986),
consumers also have opinions about the fairness of price changes. My theory of price rigidity
hinges on the assumption that consumers use nominal price changes as a trigger for re°ection
about the whether producers are fair or not. Because price increases lead consumers to re-
think the extent to which ¯rms are acting fairly, ¯rm will be reluctant to change their prices
often. This ¯ts with the suggestion that ¯rms ought to try to \improve" their product
when they raise prices. Miller (1976 p. 23) makes this suggestion to restaurants as a way
to overcome customer resistance when printing a menu with higher prices. He recommends
adding something (like potato chips) \to a standard item and creat[ing] a new package that
includes the standard but can be sold for a slightly higher price".
Consumers' evaluation of the fairness of a price-changing ¯rm depends on their infor-
mation. As their information changes, their resistance to price increases should change as
2well. A ¯rm that knows its customers would obviously time its price increases so they occur
when resistance is relatively low. Thus, the random receipt of information by consumers can
rationalize the random price changes assumed by Calvo (1983).
A di®erence with the Calvo (1983) model, however, is that price increases ought to be
more frequent when the macroeconomic environment suggests that such increases are fair.
Thus, for example, high in°ation in the past might convince consumers that costs are likely to
have increased and thus may make price increases easier to sustain. This means that lagged
in°ation can have an e®ect on current in°ation even if price-setters are purely forward-
looking. Considerations of this type may help resolve some of the empirical di±culties faced
by the unmodi¯ed Calvo (1983) model. One well known property of this model is that
it tends to predict that realistic monetary contractions have their largest impact on the
in°ation rate in the quarter in which interest rates are unexpectedly increased. Empirically,
by contrast, unexpected increases in interest rates seem to reduce in°ation only with a lag.
While several modi¯cations of the Calvo (1983) model help resolve this inconsistency (see
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)) it is worth
understanding how customer anger can do so as well.
Consider an environment with positive steady state in°ation so that the the typical ¯rm
that changes its price raises this price. A contractionary monetary policy typically reduces
the size of this price increase because the reduction in demand tends to lower marginal cost.
In the case where price rigidity is caused by the fear of consumer anger this can, paradoxically,
increase the fraction of ¯rms that raise their price. The reason is that the price increase that
¯rms now desire has just become more palatable. This increased frequency of price increases
can o®set the decline in the price chosen by those ¯rms that change their prices. There is
also a second reason for an increase in the frequency of price adjustment in the immediate
aftermath of a monetary contraction, though I do not model this explicitly. This is that such
a shock makes ¯rms realize that price increases will become less palatable once in°ation slows
down. This acts as an incentive to raise price before in°ation falls, and thereby postpones
the onset of low in°ation.
3The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents some evidence on the e®ects
of price increases. It considers whether consumer \resistance" to price increases boils down
to a precipitous fall in demand at the moment that prices are increased. Insofar as sales do
not fall sharply every time prices are raised, the model proposed in the subsequent section
is more attractive. The reason is that this model involves the possibility of sharp drops in
sales if consumers feel the price increase is unfair but, most of the time, ¯rms will choose
price changes that pass muster with their customers.
Section 3 presents the model of consumer reactions to price increases. Section 4 turns to
macroeconomic considerations by discussing a general equilibrium model with random price
changes where the frequency of price changes can depend on observable economic variables.
Section 5 then analyzes how this model behaves in response to monetary policy shocks and
Section 6 concludes.
2 What happens when prices are increased
Close observation of what happens to ¯rms that change prices is likely to contain important
information about the causes of price rigidity. For this reason, I start by studying some
features of the the scanner data from Dominick's Fine Foods.1 These data contain weekly
transactions data on price, sales and acquisition cost for a multitude of supermarket items.
The data cover several of Dominick's stores and pertains to the period that goes from Sep-
tember 1989 to May 1997. The prices for many of these items alternate between \regular"
prices and \specials". A typical example of this pattern is provided in Figure 1, which plots
the retail prices as well as the acquisition costs (averaged over stores) for the 16 oz. package
of Nabisco Premium Saltines over the 380 weeks for which data are available. Over this
period, the \regular" price of this item was changed 5 times. Within each period during
which any particular regular price prevailed, there were several subperiods where the item
was "on special" and was sold at a lower price. The Figure also shows that the acquisition
1The data were obtained from http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/mkt/Databases/DFF/Files.html.
For a longer description, see Barsky et. al. (2002).
4cost varies closely with the retail price, from which it follows that the manufacturer is closely
involved in most (if not necessarily all) decisions to change the retail price of this product.
Dominick's also sells Nabisco Saltines with either no or low salt, as well as packages in
di®erent sizes. The 16oz. package of Nabisco Premium Saltines is the most popular of these,
but the other items with the same weight sell almost always for exactly the same price. Thus,
this item seems representative of the Nabisco o®erings of this product class. Several other
manufacturers produce saltines, though only three additional brands were sold by Dominick's
for most of the duration of this particular sample. One of these is the Dominick's brand, a
second one is sold under the brand of Salerno. In addition, Dominick's carried both regular
and low salt saltines sold under the Keebler brand. Since the two Keebler products were
almost always sold for the same price, the analysis focuses on Keebler's regular product,
which was more popular. The sales of Keebler and Dominick's own brand of saltines were
comparable, though considerably smaller than those of Nabisco's brand. The sales under the
Salerno brand were somewhat smaller that those of either the Keebler or Dominick's brand.
The price that is \sticky" in this Figure is the \regular" price and it is thus of particular
interest to study the e®ects of changes in this price.2 Interestingly, the four brands carried
by Dominick's did not synchronize the timing of their \regular" prices changes. Nabisco's
Premium Saltines were ¯rst sold for $1.79, $1.89, $1.99, $2.19 and $2.29 in weeks 21, 108,
142, 327 and 364 respectively.3 Only the ¯rst of these price changes was accompanied by
changes in the regular prices of any of the main competitors. Nabisco acted as a price leader
in that competitors tended to follow its price increases, but with some delay. Salerno, for
example, followed the third, fourth and ¯fth increases with price increases in weeks 149, 339
and 373 respectively. Keebler followed the second and fourth Nabisco increases with changes
in weeks 116 and 338, while Dominick's had a price change in week 333 and thereby followed
2While my emphasis is on changes in regular prices, it is worth mentioning that total sales of this item are
signi¯cantly larger during the weeks that the item is on \special." Hendel and Nevo (2004) discuss similar
evidence for other supermarket items and relate it to models where goods are storable.
3In giving the weeks in which various events took place, I use the nomenclature for \weeks" in the
Dominick's data base. This does not coincide perfectly with the way weeks are displayed in Figure 1 because
data is not available for certain weeks.
5Nabisco's fourth increase. The ¯rst Nabisco price increase was unusual because Keebler also
raised its price to $1.78 in week 21.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the changes in quantity that accompanied these
price increases, it is worth noting that the ¯rst three of these regular price increases were
preceded by having Nabisco's Premium Saltines on special.4 The previous regular price been
charged in contiguous weeks ending in week 16, 104 and 137 respectively. To get a sense
of what happened to Nabisco's sales after regular price increases, I compare the average
number of boxes sold in the ¯rst three weeks of the new price to the average sold in the
last contiguous stretch where the previous regular price was charged to customers.5 This
comparison might overstate the declines in sales brought on by the regular price increase if
the intervening weeks where the product was on special led customers to stock up. In any
event, the last two increases are free from this problem.
The results of this comparison are presented in Table 1, which also gives the weeks of
\old" and \new" prices that are being compared, as well as the relevant percent change in
regular prices. The table shows that, on two occasions, sales actually rise substantially after
the regular price is increased while only once does the quantity decline signi¯cantly. While
generalizing from this small set of numbers is precarious, it seems fair to say that regular
price increases are not necessarily followed by big reductions in the quantity demanded, even
if competitors do not match the price increases.
One potential interpretation of these observations is that Nabisco has information about
the weeks in which demand for its own brand of saltines is higher and raises its price in those
weeks. This cannot be ruled out although week-to-week demand changes in this industry
seems di±cult to forecast since weekly sales are quite volatile. And, unless one supposes
that Nabisco has very good information about these demand variations, the evidence of
4This suggests that the ¯xed costs of physically posting new prices may play some role in the joint timing
of promotions and regular price changes.
5The advantage of using averages is that they are less a®ected by the considerable changes in week to
week sales. So as to avoid excessive smoothing of what could be a sharp sales reaction, the analysis uses only
the ¯rst three weeks with the \new" price to capture the e®ect of price changes. The results are not very
sensitive to using only the ¯rst full week with the new price or just the last three contiguous weeks with the
\old" price.
6Table 1 seems inconsistent with theories where demand is kinked at the \old" price.6 Since
competitive products whose price has remained constant are available nearby, the evidence
suggests that individuals do not respond to price increases by immediately embarking on a
search for a better deal. The evidence also seems inconsistent with a setting where customers
feel that any price increase is su±ciently unfair as to lead customers to reduce their purchases.
Rather it suggests that, insofar as customers react badly to price increases, they do so either
with a delay or only occasionally.
Given that some price increases elicit strenuous objections right away, it seems more
straightforward to suppose that consumers only react with anger on certain occasions. More-
over, the strenuous reactions that do occur appear to catch price setters by surprise. Con-
sider, for example, the reaction to those stores that raised their prices in the aftermath of the
earthquake that hit the Los Angeles area in January 1994. Some of these stores were visited
by activists and threatened with boycotts (L.A. Times, January 30, 1994). The consumer
reaction was so vociferous that Southland Corp. terminated its franchise agreement with
several 7-Eleven franchisees who raised prices during the episode (The Orange County Reg-
ister, 23 January 1994). The hypothesis that franchisees expected this particular reaction
does not seem particularly plausible.
Loud complaints have also been voiced against European stores for \rounding up" prices
when they converted them to euro's. The extent to which this behavior actually raised
average in°ation is in dispute. Nonetheless consumer groups successfully called for a mass
boycott of Greek stores in early September 2002 to protest the price gouging associated with
the euro's introduction (Reuters, September 2, 2002).7
These violent reactions in dramatic historical episodes still leave open the question of
whether the typical ¯rm that changes its price faces a signi¯cant probability of consumer
revolt. The evidence of Table 1 makes it clear that such revolts are not commonplace
6It is di±cult to believe that this information is particularly good since sales °uctuations are extremely
large even in periods with constant prices. For example, while all four major brands kept their price constant
from week 33 to week 34, Nabisco's sales fell by 21% from the former to the latter.
7Using a voting procedure, Tyran and Engelmann (2002) also induced boycotts in response to price
increases in experimental markets.
7and suggests that ¯rms change prices only when their subjective probability of a negative
consumer reaction is low. As the model developed below indicates, ¯rms may achieve this
either by having good information about the likely reaction of consumers or by pricing
conservatively.
3 A One-period Model with Fairness Concerns
Consider a ¯rm that must choose its price for one period and which, leaving aside fair-
ness considerations, faces a production and preference structure similar to Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). In particular, suppose a unit mass of households each produces his own
di®erentiated good and that household i's instantaneous utility at t is given by
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This implies that, if all households maximize (1) and producers sell the quantity de-
manded by households, yi
t equals Et
Pt
³
Pi
t
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where Et denotes total household expenditure
at t. Suppose that producers only expect to make these sales if their prices are regarded as
fair. In particular, there is a price ¹ P i
t such that consumers stop buying even though the max-
imization of (1) would lead to positive purchases at this price. This consumer reaction can
be justi¯ed by supposing that consumers actually maximize a utility function that is more
elaborate than (1) and that this utility function takes into account consumer's perception
8of the extent to which producers are generous towards consumers. Consumers want their
sellers to feel altruism towards them and expect ¯rm i to set prices so as to maximize
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where ¸i is a measure of producer i's altruism while w
j
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of household j's utility (which may, for example, involve no consumption of good i). To
simplify the discussion of the one-period model, suppose that the producer's expenditure
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Not surprisingly, a higher value of ¸ leads to a lower price while a higher value of the cost
indicator Ái
t leads to a higher one. In a symmetric equilibrium where all households have the
same u0, the optimal price satis¯es
P i
t
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u0 (4)
This price is well de¯ned even if µ < 1 as long as ¸ + µ > 1. In the extreme case where
¸ = 1, this price implements the ¯rst best outcome.
Consumers do not know the costs or the ¸ of their suppliers. However, if the information
available to consumers allows them to reject the null hypothesis that the ¸ of a producer is
at least equal to ¹ ¸, consumers stop purchasing from this producer. In e®ect, household j
chooses his consumption basket by maximizing
u(C
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Z
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where ¹ wi
t is the value of wi
t without the consumer's purchase, ¸c is an arbitrarily large number
and Ã is a step function which equals zero if the consumer cannot reject the hypothesis that
¯rm i's ¸ equals at least ¹ ¸ against the alternative that it is smaller. If, instead, consumers are
9able to reject the hypothesis that ¸i = ¹ ¸, then the function Ã equals one.8 Since consumers
believe that producers set prices according to (4), the hypothesis they are testing is the
hypothesis that the ¯rm's marginal cost implied by (4) with a ¸ = ¹ ¸ is consistent with the
consumers' subjective distribution concerning this costs. This hypothesis is rejected if the
producer's price is above some critical level, because this would require that the producers'
costs be implausibly large.
This model of consumer behavior, with its assumption that consumers want to harm ¯rms
that treat them unfairly, is closely related to Rabin (1993). His model of fairness involves
three key ingredients. These are a de¯nition of \kindness", a de¯nition of \equitable payo®s"
and a speci¯cation of preferences that depend on both one's own kindness and the kindness
one expects from the person one is dealing with. He measures the expected kindness of the
second player towards the ¯rst by the di®erence between the payo®s that the ¯rst expects
to receive from the second and the payo®s that it would \equitable" for the second to give
to the ¯rst. He then de¯nes equitable payo®s as being equal to the average of the highest
and the lowest payo®s the second agent can give to the ¯rst under the assumption that
the player acts e±ciently. Lastly, he supposes that agents maximize the sum of their own
material payo®s and the product of their own kindness times the kindness they expect to
receive from the other agent. Thus, if the ¯rst agent expects the second to give the ¯rst a
payo® that is higher than the \equitable" payo®, the ¯rst agent seeks to raise the second
agent's payo® above that agent's equitable payo®.9
While this approach to fairness is quite similar to Rabin's (1993) in its use of a psycholog-
ical utility function that seeks to reward like with like, there are some di®erences in the two
speci¯cations. From the point of view of generating price rigidity, one of the key di®erences
8In this paper, I consider only altruism of the ¯rm towards consumers. However, corporations also seek
to appear \corporately responsible" by engaging in charitable activities. Moreover Campbell (1999) provides
questionnaire evidence that people's perception of the fairness of raising the price of a doll whose demand
is high just before Christmas depends on whether the proceeds will go to charity or whether they will be
kept by the store. Thus, consumers may also refrain from punishing ¯rms that are altruistic towards people
other than the consumers themselves.
9For extensions of the Rabin (1993) model to dynamic games, see Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
10is the supposition that the psychological utility function is highly nonlinear. In this model,
consumers have a neutral attitude towards ¯rm pro¯ts in a broad set of circumstances. Pos-
itive utility for punishing a ¯rm arises only if consumers feel the ¯rm has behaved in a
demonstrably egregious manner. This speci¯cation predicts that consumer reactions will be
subject to threshold e®ects, where consumers react only to what they perceive to be extreme
cases. When they do react, on the other hand, their reactions are strong. Casual observa-
tion suggests that this ¯ts the reactions of consumers somewhat better than the supposition
that consumers react in a \continuous" way to bad behavior by the ¯rm. It is much more
common to hear calls for complete boycotts than calls for small reductions in the purchases
from particular ¯rms, for example.
A second di®erence with Rabin's (1993) analysis is that he supposes that each player
knows both the preferences and the opportunities available to the other. In the case of
consumers, it is not plausible to suppose that their information regarding their supplier's
circumstances is very good. I have thus cast the analysis in parametric terms, consumers use
their information to estimate and test hypotheses about the value of one parameter. The
use of an altruism parameter seems particularly straightforward and has the advantage that
the parameter remains meaningful even if very little is known about the ¯rm.
If all consumers have the same information, this speci¯cation implies that there is a price
for each ¯rm, ¹ P i
t such that consumers do not purchase if ¯rm i's price is above ¹ P i
t. Suppose
that this leads the producer not to purchase or produce and that u(0) = v(0) = 0. Let
producers have a p.d.f. over ¹ P i
t given by G. This p.d.f. is a step function if the ¯rm knows
the true value of ¹ P i
t. The analysis is somewhat simpli¯ed by supposing that producers are,
in fact, sel¯sh.10 Thus P i
t maximizes
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10Letting producers have a positive ¸ complicates the algebra but does not change the analysis appreciably.
A more elaborate extension would have consumers test the hypothesis that producers ¸'s equal ¹ ¸ taking into
account that producers are second-guessing the price that would lead consumers to stop making purchases.
The structure of the model would then be more similar to that of signaling models.
11The ¯rst order condition for this problem is
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When the price P ¤ that makes the expression in curly brackets equal to zero has the property
that G(P ¤) = 0, the solution to this ¯rst order condition is to set P i
t = P ¤. Otherwise the
optimal price is lower than P ¤ and there are two cases to consider. In the ¯rst, the price
P i
t that maximizes (6) is interior so that (7) is satis¯ed as an equality at this price. In
the second, the price that maximizes (6) is the price ~ P that satis¯es G( ~ P) = 0 and thus
guarantees that consumers regard this price as fair. This second solution applies when g( ~ P)
is su±ciently large that (7) holds as an inequality at ~ P. In this case, the ¯rm charges ~ P
because there is a large kink in the demand curve at this price.11
This model can justify price rigidity from one period to the next even if one supposes
that the optimum is of this last type (perhaps because G is a step function at ~ P). However,
one would then have to imagine that ¹ P is perfectly rigid over time. Since consumers are
bombarded with information about the economy on a daily basis, it is more attractive to
suppose that they do update their distribution of producer costs from one day to the next.
A more plausible model of price rigidity follows from assuming that consumers do not
revise their opinion about the ¯rm's altruism until the ¯rm changes its price. While I do not
derive conditions under which this is optimal for consumers, it ¯ts with Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler (1986) who suppose that an action is regarded as fair if it is better, or at least not
worse than a reference action. For the most part, like Rabin (1994), they see actions as fair if
they somehow balance the interests of the two parties. But, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1986) also assert that reference actions are often dictated by the past. According to them,
changes in conditions including reductions in wages and increases in prices are regarded as
unfair unless it is common knowledge that the ¯rm who imposes these changes would su®er
11The optimization problem of a ¯rm setting a new price is then very similar to the optimization considered
in Sibly (2002) for the case where consumers are \loss averse." He uses this term to describe settings where
the slope of consumers' demand curve is discontinuous at a \reference price".
12greatly without taking these actions.
One reason why consumers may not revise the fairness of the prices they pay if these are
identical in nominal terms to those that they have paid in the past is that this rule of thumb
saves on costs of computation. Moreover, in the presence of a positive level of trend in°ation
¯rms that keep their nominal prices constant at t do tend to o®er consumers a better deal
than they did at t ¡ 1. Thus, this rule of thumb may not be very costly to consumers. A
second reason for consumers to refrain from re-evaluating the fairness of a ¯rm's price when
this price remains constant is that consumers may believe the ¯rm has large administrative
costs of changing prices. If consumers had such a belief, they would not change their estimate
of ¸f even if the ¯rm kept its price constant under a broad range of circumstances.
Suppose that economic conditions change from t ¡ 1 to t, so the ¯rm contemplates a
change in its price. There are now two illuminating extreme cases to consider. In the
¯rst, consumers have no memory of past costs. Thus, they can only compare their current
subjective p.d.f. of costs to the current price as above. Knowledge of the past price may be
helpful to consumers in this setting, but only insofar as it contains information about the
¯rm's current costs.
If P ¤ satis¯es (7) because G(P ¤) = 0, the ¯rm chooses its ¯rst best action in spite of the
customers scrutiny of the ¯rm's altruism. Indeed, in this case, there is no reason for the ¯rm
to choose to repeat its earlier price. Now suppose that G(P ¤) > 0. The ¯rm now keeps its
price equal to Pt¡1, its price in the previous period, if the price that maximizes (6) (which
is below P ¤) is lower than Pt¡1. Keeping the price constant leads to a price which is closer
to the ¯rm's unconstrained optimum without creating any risk of customer complaints.
This bene¯t of constant prices can lead ¯rms to increase prices only in those periods where
consumers have a particularly generous estimate of the ¯rm's costs, and this motivation for
price rigidity lies at the basis for the multi-period model below. This logic can explain
downwards price rigidity in response to falls in cost even when consumers are relatively well
informed because the resulting high pro¯ts are not visible enough to lead to complaints.
Even if consumers were unaware of cost changes, prices would fall if costs fell so much that
13the price that maximizes the objective function wi
t also satis¯es (7). Even so, the fall in
prices would be less than proportional to the fall in costs even if the elasticity of demand
were constant.12
Suppose that, instead, the price that maximizes (6) is above Pt¡1, so that prices would
be expected to rise. If the price that maximizes (6) is ~ P such that G( ~ P) = 0, the ¯rm should
increase its price. The reason is that it thereby increases the value of its objective function
without increasing the probability of a consumer revolt. In this case the price is not rigid in
the sense of staying constant.
On the other hand, keeping the price constant is good for the ¯rm if the optimum is
interior and the price that satis¯es (7), is su±ciently close to Pt¡1. By keeping the price
constant, the producer gets u(Pt¡1) ¡ v(Pt¡1) while he gets [1 ¡ G(P i
t)][u(P i
t) ¡ v(P i
t)] if
he raises it to P i
t. Since G(P i
t) > 0 the latter can be less than the former. Thus, fear
of consumer re-evaluation of the ¯rm's fairness can act as a \¯xed" cost of price changes
that keeps ¯rm prices constant. What makes the model di®er from one with a simple ¯xed
cost, however, is that the magnitude of the price change matters as well. This ¯ts with the
evidence of Zbaracki et al (2004) who report that salesmen are much more worried about
negative reactions to large price increases than they are about small ones.
Consumers are particularly likely to react to large price changes, as opposed to high levels
of prices if they have a di®use prior about the level of costs but have a more precise estimate
of the percent change in marginal cost from t ¡ 1 to t. For a given elasticity of demand,
consumers expect prices to rise by the same percent change as marginal cost regardless of
the level of ¯rm altruism. Only increases in price that do not correspond closely to increases
in costs are likely to trigger consumer anger. Supposing once again that consumers only
compute whether the ¯rm is being fair when the ¯rm changes its prices, the ¯rm will tend to
keep its price constant if its optimal price at t, P i
t is both interior and close to its inherited
price Pt¡1.
12This logic might explain the widening of pro¯t margins for U.S. co®ee distributors as the wholesale price
of co®ee fell dramatically between 1997 and 2002. See Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2002 for a brief discussion
of the relevant facts.
144 A Multi-period General Equilibrium Model
This section extends the model to a dynamic setting, while considering only a very simpli-
¯ed structure for the information available to consumers and ¯rms. Household i's material
payo®s, i.e. his utility function at t in the absence of fairness concerns is now given by
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
tw
i
t (8)
Suppose that there are full insurance markets against idiosyncratic risks while ¯rms
have enough information to avoid angering their customers (so this event is not covered
by insurance). Each individual's consumption at t is then a ¯xed fraction of aggregate
consumption Yt (which in turn equals Et=Pt). With ex ante identical households, this means
that the equilibrium value for u0 is the same for all of them. In addition to having access
to a full set of insurance markets, households can borrow and lend at the riskless nominal
rate Rt. This means that they must be indi®erent between consuming an additional unit of
consumption at t and expecting to consume (1+Rt)Pt=Pt+1 additional units of consumption
at t + 1. Thus
Et
(
¯(1 + Rt)Ptu0(Yt+1)
Pt+1
)
= u
0(Yt): (9)
Consider a setting where the beliefs of consumers about what constitutes fair pricing for
any given ¯rm evolve stochastically from period to period and from ¯rm to ¯rm even though
all ¯rms are identical. At any given time, consumers believe that the cost of any particular
¯rm are either high (with Ái
t = ©H
t ) or low (with Ái
t = ÁL
t < ©H
t ). In addition, consumers
observe signals equal to ^ Ái
t for each ¯rm. These signals are drawn independently across ¯rms
from the p.d.f. Ft(^ Á). Households view this signal as being equal to the true value of Ái
t
(which they see as being either ©H
t or ©L
t ) plus a random measurement error z which is
drawn from the p.d.f. H(z). Thus, the consumers' subjective probability that the ¯rm has
a cost parameter ©H
t given a signal equal to ^ Ái
t or lower equals H(^ Ái
t ¡ ©H
t ).
As before, a ¯rm which keeps its price constant does not face a re-evaluation of its fairness.
With a su±ciently large level of steady state in°ation, ¯rms do not ever ¯nd it optimal to
15lower their prices in this setting. It is then unimportant to understand how consumers react
to price decreases.13
Now consider the inferences of consumers that know Pt about a ¯rm that raises its price
to P i
t. Using (4) consumers can determine whether P i
t is consistent with ¸ ¸ ¹ ¸ for each of
the two possible values of Ái
t. Suppose that ©L
t is su±ciently low that Pt
µ©L
t
µ+¹ ¸¡1
v0
u0 is always
lower than the price charged by the ¯rm in the previous period. Under the hypothesis that
Ái
t equals ©t
H, by contrast a ¯rm can raise its price with impunity as long as
P
i
t · Pt
µ©H
t
µ + ¹ ¸ ¡ 1
v0
u0: (10)
Consider then a ¯rm that changes its price and keeps it below this upper bound. Since
the probability of receiving a signal as unfavorable as Ái
t given that the ¯rm's cost parameter
is ©H
t equals H(^ Ái
t ¡ ©H
t ), consumers will reject the hypothesis that this ¯rm's altruism
parameter equals at least ¹ ¸ if
H(^ Á
i
t ¡ ©
H
t ) < ° (11)
where ° is the size of the test used by consumers. Firms whose ^ Ái
t is lower than the critical
value of this test are better o® keeping their price unchanged. To simplify the analysis,
suppose that ¯rms know the value of ^ Ái
t. They thus keep their prices constant with probability
®t, which is given by
®t = Ft(H
¡1(°) + ©
H
t ) (12)
If Ft and ©H
t are constant over time, this model is thus equivalent to the Calvo (1983)
model where the probability of changing prices is constant. This model is easier to analyze
in the case where producers can charge any price they wish whenever (11) is violated. The
conditions under which this is valid are derived below. Given full insurance markets, a one
dollar increase in pro¯ts in period t + j raises expected utility at t by Et¯ju0(Yt+j)=Pt+j.
13In the absence of such steady state in°ation, price decreases are sometimes optimal. One might, however,
be able to reduce the incidence of such price declines by supposing that even price declines lead consumers
to re-evaluate the fairness of a ¯rm's prices.
16Thus, the optimal price maximizes
Et
1 X
j=0
¯
j(
j Y
`=1
®t+`)
h
u
0(Yt+j)Yt+j
Ã
P i
t
Pt+j
!1¡µ
¡ v
0
@Yt+j
Ã
P i
t
Pt+j
!¡µ1
A
i
(13)
over P i
t. The ¯rst order condition for this problem is
Et
1 X
j=0
¯
j(
j Y
`=1
®t+`)Yt+j
Ã
P i
t
Pt+j
!¡µ h
(1 ¡ µ)u
0(Yt+j)
Ã
P i
t
Pt+j
!
¡ µv
0
0
@Yt+j
Ã
P i
t
Pt+j
!¡µ1
A
i
= 0:
Consider the case where u0(c) equals uoc¡¾ while v0(y) is proportional to voy!. Letting
Xt denote the relative price of price changers and dividing through by (P i
t=Pt)¡µ,
X
1+µ!
t =
µvo=uo
1 ¡ µ
Et
P1
j=0 ¯j(
Qj
`=1 ®t+`(1 + ¼t+`)µ(1+!))Y
1+!
t+j
Et
P1
j=0 ¯j(
Qj
`=1 ®t+`(1 + ¼t+`)µ¡1)Y
1¡¾
t+j
(14)
where ¼t =
Pt¡Pt¡1
Pt¡1 . If ©H
t is su±ciently large, this value of Xt satis¯es (10). Thus, ¯rms
whose ~ Ái
t is su±ciently large to change prices, set their price according to (14).
Given the common choice of P i
t=Pt, (2) implies
"
(1 ¡ ®t)X
1¡µ
t + ®t
µPt¡1
Pt
¶1¡µ# 1
1¡µ
= 1: (15)
In a steady state with constant in°ation ¼, and constant probability of changing prices
® this implies
(1 ¡ ®)X
1¡µ + ®(1 + ¼)
µ¡1 = 1: (16)
With positive in°ation, the relative price of each price setter declines until he is again
able to set his relative price to X. Let ~ xt, ~ yt, ~ ®t and ~ ¼t denote the logarithmic deviations
from their steady state values of X, Y , ® and 1 + ¼ respectively.
Supposing that the equilibrium remains near a steady state, one can describe its proper-
ties by di®erentiating (15), and using (16) to substitute for the steady state value of X,
~ ¼t =
1 ¡ ®(1 + ¼)µ¡1
®(1 + ¼)µ¡1 ~ xt +
(1 + ¼)1¡µ ¡ 1
(1 ¡ ®)(µ ¡ 1)
~ ®t: (17)
Using L to denote the lag operator and di®erentiating (14),
(1+µ!)~ xt = Et
1
1 ¡ ¸1=L
µ
c
y
1~ yt+¸1~ ®t+1+¸1µ(1+!)~ ¼t+1
¶
+Et
1
1 ¡ ¸2=L
µ
c
y
2~ yt¡¸2~ ®t+1¡¸2(µ¡1)~ ¼t+1
¶
17¸1 ´ ®¯(1+¼)
µ(1+!); ¸2 ´ ®¯(1+¼)
µ¡1; c
y
1 ´ (1+ !)(1 ¡¸1); c
y
2 ´ (¾ ¡1)(1 ¡¸2): (18)
When the steady state rate of in°ation ¼ equals zero, the coe±cient of ~ ® in (17) equals
zero. In addition, ¸1 = ¸2 = ®¯ in this case, so that the coe±cient of ~ ® in (18) is zero
as well. Thus small variations in ® have no e®ect on economic outcomes. The reason is
that, with zero steady state in°ation, the steady state value of X is 1.00 so that each ¯rm's
average price change equals zero. Thus, an increase in the number of price changers does
not typically a®ect the price level. When in°ation is positive, by contrast, X > 1 and the
typical price changer raises his price. While the e®ect of changes in ® is necessarily small
for ¼ su±ciently small, the analysis below shows that the e®ect of small variations in ~ ® can
be signi¯cant even if steady state in°ation is equal to just 5 percent per year.
The computation of deviations from the steady state equilibrium require also the lin-
earization of (9) as well as a linearized reaction function for the central bank. For purposes
of illustration, suppose that the latter is given by
~ it = c
i
¼~ ¼t + c
i
1~ it¡1 + ²
i
t: (19)
The object of the next section is to analyze the response of the economy to monetary
policy shocks ²i
t. While this is only meant to be illustrative, it uses parameter values that
are similar to those in the literature. In particular, ¯ is set to :99, ¾ = 1 while µ and ! equal
7.88 and .47 respectively, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). While the analysis focuses
on an annual in°ation equals 5%, the case of 50% in°ation provides a useful comparison.
As when there are ¯xed costs of changing prices, one would expect price adjustment to
be more frequent when in°ation is more rapid. On the other hand, ¯xed costs of changing
prices also imply that the departure of the reset price from the average price (i.e. X) is
larger when in°ation is larger, and this is consistent with the experience of high in°ation
countries. I thus suppose that, when annual in°ation equals 5%, the typical price-changing
¯rm sets a price 5% above that of its peers so that the steady state value of X equals 1.05.
The typical price changer is then raising his price by P i
t=Pt¡1, or X(1 + ¼), which equals
6.3%. Using (16), this value of X implies that ¯rms adjust their prices on average once a
18year and ® equals .76. By contrast, when annual in°ation equals 50%, I suppose X = 1:06
and the resulting value of ® is only .25. Aside from the consistency with models of ¯xed
costs of changing prices, Bakhshi et al (2003) report that having ® fall relatively rapidly
with in°ation is necessary to ensure that output does not become excessively sensitive to
in°ation as steady state in°ation rises.
Let the two parameters of the monetary policy rule, ci
¼ and ci
1 be equal .9. These high
values ensure both that the ²i
t shock has persistent e®ects and that the equilibrium is determi-
nate. It turns out that the conditions for determinacy are substantially more stringent when
the equilibrium is approximated around a steady state with positive in°ation then when it
is approximated around one with zero in°ation, as is more standard. In the standard case,
discussed for example in Woodford (2003), determinacy obtains even with ci
1 = 0 as long as
ci
¼ ¸ 1. By contrast,if ci
1 = 0, determinacy when ¼ = :05 requires that ci
¼ be no smaller than
2.8.14
5 Monetary Policy
Figure 2 illustrates a standard result, namely that when ® is constant, the drop in in°ation is
largest in the quarter where interest rates ¯rst increase. This pattern of responses of in°ation
to monetary policy shocks di®ers from estimated responses because, in the latter, the largest
reduction in in°ation takes place sometime after the monetary policy shock. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) ¯nd that the biggest response takes place after two quarters. Other studies
¯nd longer delays, with Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) reporting a maximum
response after 9 quarters.
In an important extension of the Calvo (1983) model, Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999)
maintain the assumption that costs of changing prices are independently distributed over
time for each individual ¯rm but relax the assumption that these costs are drawn from a two
point distribution where the costs are either negligible or prohibitive. Instead, they let the
costs be drawn from a compact set. When a ¯rm faces the lowest possible cost of changing
14This substantial quantitative di®erence has been found independently in Kiley (2004).
19prices, it is quite likely to adjust its price. It is less likely to do so if this realized cost is
somewhat higher because it is then tempted to wait in the hope that future costs will be
lower. On the other hand, a ¯rm will change its price even if its realized cost is relatively
high as long as its existing price is su±ciently far from the optimal one.
Unfortunately, this modi¯cation appears to exacerbate the tendency for in°ation to fall
immediately when interest rates are increased.15 The reason is that, in an environment with
positive steady state in°ation, a reduction in future in°ation means that the prices that
maximize pro¯ts in the future are now closer to Pt itself. This is re°ected in the fall in Xt
at the moment that ²i
t rises. Because an increase in ²i
t leads ¯rms that change prices to raise
them by less, the payo® from adjusting prices falls relative to the payo® of doing nothing.
With a compact set of realizations for the cost of changing prices, this reduces the fraction of
¯rms that adjust their prices at t. Since the typical price-adjusting ¯rm is actually increasing
its price, this reduction in the fraction of ¯rms that adjust their price lowers in°ation at t
even further.
If, instead, price rigidity is due to fear of customer reactions rather than to ¯xed costs
of changing prices, rather di®erent patterns of responses are possible. In particular, one
would expect that the reduction in Xt induced by a contractionary monetary policy would
make it easier for ¯rms to raise their prices so that they charge their desired price. Thus, if
consumers react to the the price charged by price changers, more ¯rms might be willing to
change their price after a monetary contraction.
A small modi¯cation of the earlier analysis produces this result. Suppose, in particular,
that consumers do not know the value of ©H
t . It would then be natural to infer this value
from the prices charged by those ¯rms whose ~ Áh
i is high since these ¯rms are not constrained
by the possibility of consumer anger. Since these unconstrained ¯rms all choose the same
Xt, it seems reasonable for consumers to treat them as having the expected level of altruism
15They carry out their analysis by considering changes in the growth of the money supply. However, the
logic of their analysis ought to carry over to monetary policy reaction functions like (19).
20¹ ¸. Using (4), then provides an estimate of ©H
t , namely
©
H
t =
µ + ¹ ¸ ¡ 1
µ
u0
v0Xt (20)
A higher value of Xt raises the estimate of ©H
t since it suggests that the costs of legitimate
price changers are higher. Equation (12) then implies that the fraction of ¯rms that keep
their price constant rises because, as can be seen from (11), only ¯rms with higher values of
~ Ái
t can raise their price with impunity.
A second plausible determinant of ®t is the rate of in°ation at t. It seems reasonable to
suppose that a higher in°ation rate leads consumers to be more willing to countenance price
increases. A crude method for capturing this is to suppose that the distribution F shifts to
the right when ¼t is higher, so that consumers tend to draw higher values of ~ Ái
t. Such a shift
to a stochastically dominant distribution implies that the probability of realizations below
(H¡1(°)+©H
t ) falls. Equation (12) then implies a reduction in ®t. These e®ects can, to ¯rst
order, be captured by the linearized equation
~ ®t = c
®
X~ xt + c
®
¼~ ¼t¡1 (21)
where c®
X is positive while c®
¼ is negative.
Figure 2 also reports responses when ~ ® is given by (21) with c®
X = 2:5 and c®
¼ = ¡15.16
These parameters are such that ®t initially falls (because Xt falls) and then rises (because
in°ation falls). The result is that, when the annual steady state in°ation rate is 5%, in°ation
has its lowest point two quarters after the monetary shock. Moreover, the fall in in°ation
is much smaller in the initial quarter than when ® is ¯xed. In the latter case, in°ation falls
by about .18% with an initial increase in the rate of interest of .88%. By contrast, when ®
is given by (21), in°ation falls initially by only .06% even though the interest rate rises by
.95%. This di®erence obtains even though the fraction of ¯rms keeping their price constant
falls by only about 1.8%. Since ¯rms who adjust their price in steady state do so by about
6.3%, having 1.8% more of them do so raises in°ation by about .11% so this does not fully
16I have also considered speci¯cations with c®
¼ = 0. Unfortunately, these speci¯cations also imply that the
largest fall in in°ation occurs in the quarter of the monetary policy shock.
21account for the di®erence in in°ation responses. The rest is accounted for by the fact that
Xt falls more when ® is constant. This occurs because, with variable ®, ¯rms who adjust
their price realize that price adjustments will become more infrequent in the future (because
the reduction in in°ation will push up ®t+j). Given the existence of underlying in°ation,
this leads them to charge slightly higher prices at t.
Interestingly, neither the path of output nor that of interest rates is signi¯cantly a®ected
by these changed dynamics of in°ation. The lack of monotonicity in the in°ation response
means that the real rate rises less initially but stays higher for a longer period of time when
® is variable. The real rate of interest on a long term bond, which determines the initial
response of output, is similar in both cases.
Results are qualitatively similar when the steady state annual in°ation rate is 50% and
c®
¼ = ¡10. In°ation falls much less on impact than with a ¯xed ® and it reaches its lowest
point in the second quarter rather than the ¯rst. The reason the decline in in°ation is much
smaller even though ®t falls by less than one percent is that the typical price changer is
now changing prices by 17.3% so that having 1% more price changers raises in°ation by
.17%. The result of this modest fall in in°ation is that, compared with keeping ® constant,
interest rates fall back more slowly so that output falls signi¯cantly more. This result is
attractive because the frequency of price adjustment is high when in°ation is high, so that
a model with ¯xed frequency of price adjustment would appear to have di±culty predicting
large output responses to monetary policy in in°ationary environments. Yet, stabilizations
in high in°ation countries often do involve substantial losses in output.
Because the model of endogenous variations in ® is only tentative, it is worthwhile to
carry out some calculations treating ® as exogenous. This involves looking at the impulse
responses of output, in°ation and interest rates to monetary shocks by considering what
seem a priori plausible responses of ®t. Note that variations in ®t ought in principle to
be observable. Thus, a more ambitious research agenda would analyze how the rest of the
economy ought to react given the actual responses of the fraction of ¯rms changing prices.
It would then proceed also to try to explain the actual movement in the fraction of price
22changers.
Before carrying out this analysis, it is worth giving one additional reason for ® to fall
in the immediate aftermath of a monetary contraction. Such a contraction ought to lead
sophisticated price setters to realize that in°ation will slow so that price increases will become
more di±cult to \sell" in the future. This ought to lead some ¯rms that would have kept
their prices constant in the absence of the tightening to raise prices and thereby increase
the risk of contemporaneous negative reactions by customers. The advantage of doing so is
that price setters can still point to past in°ation as a reason for the price increase while this
will become harder in the future. Unfortunately, this mechanism does not ¯t into the model
developed so far because, for simplicity, ¯rms kept the probability of negative reactions equal
to zero. By contrast, the mechanism I just suggested requires that ¯rms be willing to increase
this probability above zero under some circumstances.
Suppose that the pattern of exogenous responses of ®t is given by
~ ®t = 1:02~ ®t¡1 ¡ :116~ ®t¡2 ¡ :302~ ®t¡3 ¡ c
²²
i
t (22)
As depicted in Figure 3, this implies that a monetary contraction ¯rst raises the fraction of
price adjusters and, after a few quarters, lowers this fraction below its steady state value.
This pattern would be reasonable if a contractionary shock reduced in°ation only after
several quarters, because this would justify both the initial rush of price adjustments and
the subsequent reduction in the fraction of adjusters. The initial rush could then be due
either to the reduction in Xt or to the desire to raise prices while one can still point to a
recent episode of relatively high in°ation.
With c² set equal to 3, the resulting responses of output, in°ation and interest rates are
plotted in Figure 3 as well. The Figure shows that the response of in°ation is indeed delayed
for several quarters, and in°ation reaches its minimum 6 quarters after the initial burst of
interest rates. Thus, the responses of ® in (22 seem to yield a pattern of in°ation responses
(where in°ation at ¯rst does little even though X falls and then in°ation later declines)
which makes the responses assumed in (22) reasonable. It is worth noting, however, that
23these responses of ® are substantially larger in absolute magnitude than the responses of
in°ation. It remains unclear whether such a di®erence in the size of these responses is
justi¯able through an explicit model of consumer behavior.
Because in°ation responds so modestly, (19) implies a slow return of interest rates to their
steady state value. This means that real interest rates stay high for some time and that the
output drop is considerable. Such large output declines are not particularly realistic but the
exercise does show that a contractionary monetary policy with long lived output e®ects is
perfectly consistent with muted and delayed responses of in°ation.
An obviously unrealistic feature of these responses is that output has its biggest fall
instantaneously. To account for gradual reductions in output the model has to be modi¯ed
either by adding decision lags (as in Rotemberg and Woodford 1997) or by changing the
speci¯cation of preferences so consumers try to smooth output changes. As suggested by
Fuhrer (2000), one way of obtaining \hump shaped" responses of output in monetary models
of this type is to suppose that consumers have preferences that can be characterized by \habit
persistence". It is thus worthwhile to consider brie°y a modi¯cation of the model along these
lines.
Let ¹ Ct represent the \habit" and specialize the utility from consumption so that
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t[
(Ci
t)1¡¾
(1 ¡ ¾) ¹ Ct
¡ v(y
i
t)]: (23)
Following Abel (1990), let this habit be external to the individual. Speci¯cally, suppose
that ¹ Ct = Y
Ã
t¡1. The case Ã = 0 corresponds to the utility function used so far.
The consumer must still be indi®erent to consuming one less dollar at t and consuming
the proceeds from investing this dollar in a nominal asset yielding Rt at t + 1. This now
requires that
Et¯
(1 + Rt)PtY
Ã
t¡1C
¡¾
t+1
Pt+1Y
Ã
t C
¡¾
t
= 1: (24)
This change in the utility function also a®ects the value of marginal utility in (13). Using
Y
¡¾
t =Y
Ã
t¡1 for this marginal utility, (14) becomes
24X
1+µ!
t =
µvo=uo
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Et
P1
j=0 ¯j(
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`=1 ®t+`(1 + ¼t+`)µ(1+!))Y
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Et
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j=0 ¯j(
Qj
`=1 ®t+`(1 + ¼t+`)µ¡1)Y
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To compute impulse responses, (18) must be modi¯ed accordingly. The responses for
Ã = ¡:7 are plotted in Figure 4, which also shows the responses for constant ®t as a
benchmark. When comparing Figures 3 and 4 for the case of constant ®, one sees that the
higher value of Ã does induce a hum-shaped response of output. In addition, the e®ect of
the monetary disturbance on in°ation rises, particularly relative to the response of output.
With c² = 3, on the other hand, the response of output to the monetary disturbance is quite
large, though it remains hump-shaped. The reason, in part, is that the resulting swings in
® are large enough to mute considerably the initial response of in°ation. This means that
the real interest rate rises a great deal and this induces large swings in output.
Figure 4 thus shows that hump shaped responses of output together with modest in°ation
responses are not at all inconsistent with the model as long as ® varies in the requisite ways.
The qualitative features of the required response of ® remain intuitively appealing. Whether
the actual magnitude of this response is either empirically valid and whether it can be derived
from a quantitative model of consumer behavior remain open questions for research.
6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that the threat of consumer anger can account for the constancy
of prices from one period to the next while also having the potential to explain some of
the dynamic responses of the economy to monetary policy shocks. The consumer reactions
in the model are \irrational" in the sense that consumers are maximizing something other
than a utility function that depends only on their own material payo®s. Rather, they also
wish to harm (or at least not to help) ¯rms that they see as having given them a bad deal.
Understandably, this leads ¯rms to be careful not to induce these emotional reactions.
One attraction of modelling price rigidity as stemming from consumer reactions is that
this provides a new mechanism through which lack of information about economic conditions
25translates into muted price responses. It is easy to believe that consumers are poorly informed
about cost changes and this may lead ¯rms that are concerned with consumer reactions
to make their prices less sensitive to costs. By contrast, more standard models in which
poor information leads to sluggish price adjustment suppose directly that producers are
imperfectly informed about either costs or demand. Given the huge incentives for producers
to acquire all relevant information and given that a small number of sophisticated individuals
makes the bulk of the economy's pricing decisions, this approach seems less attractive.
Heterogeneity in information sets ought not to be con¯ned to di®erences between pro-
ducers and consumers. Consumers, in particular, are likely to di®er a great deal from each
other in both their information and their attitude towards suppliers. Nonetheless, anger
at producers appears to be communicable and this seems capable of leading to the sort of
discontinuous change in purchases considered in this paper. Thus, information transmission
from one set of consumers to another, particularly in situations where some consumers feel
that the ¯rm has stepped over the line, seems to be important in practice. Modelling this
information transmission thus remains an important topic for future research.
Another attractive modi¯cation would involve allowing consumers to be more aware of
the actual problems faced by producers. In the current model, consumers have a theory about
how \fair" producers behave and producers take this theory into account when setting prices.
While inherently plausible, the theory that consumers have about producer behavior does
not correspond as closely as seems desirable to the way the producers actually behave in the
model. In particular, it would be attractive to let consumers recognize that producers solve
a dynamic model when they set prices.
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31Figure 2: Responses for both constant and variable ®
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32Figure 3: Responses with exogenous ®
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33Figure 4: Responses with exogenous ® and habit persistence
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